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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
There is a large amount of intermediated borrowing and lending between households. Some of it is 
intergenerational, but most is between older households. The average difference in borrowing and lending 
rates is over 2 percent. In this paper, we develop a model economy that displays these facts and matches 
not only the returns on assets but also their quantities. The heterogeneity giving rise to borrowing and 
lending and differences in equity holdings depends on differences in the strength of the bequest motive. In 
equilibrium, the lenders are annuity holders and the borrowers are those who have equity holdings, who 
live off its income when retired, and who leave a bequest.  The borrowing rate and return on equity are 
the same in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. The divergence between borrowing and lending rates 
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1. Introduction: 
A limitation of the homogenous household construct is that it precludes the 
modelling of borrowing and lending amongst agents. In equilibrium, the shadow price of 
consumption at date t+1 in terms of consumption at date t is such that the amount of 
borrowing and lending is zero. Homogenous household models are thus incapable of 
matching the quantities of assets held and intermediated. 
To address this issue, we construct a model economy that incorporates agent 
heterogeneity in the form of differences in the strength of their bequest motive. In light of 
our earlier finding (1985) that the premium for bearing non-diversifiable aggregate risk is 
small, our analysis abstracts from aggregate risk.  The only uncertainty that agents face is 
idiosyncratic risk about the duration of their lifetime after retirement. All agents have 
identical preferences for consumption; however, they differ with respect to their intensity 
for bequests. In equilibrium, those with a strong bequest motive accumulate equity assets, 
borrow, and upon retirement, live off the income of these assets. Households with no 
bequest motive buy annuities during their working years and consume the annuity 
benefits over their retirement years. 
The incorporation of agent heterogeneity allows us to capture a key empirical 
fact: there is a large amount of borrowing and lending between households, in particular, 
between older households. This borrowing is done either directly, by issuing mortgages 
to finance owner occupied housing or indirectly, by owning partially debt financed rental 
properties through direct or limited partnerships or REITS. We abstract from the small 
amount of borrowing and lending that occurs directly between households and assume 
that all of it is intermediated through financial institutions such as banks and pension   2
funds. For the United States, in 2005 the amount intermediated was approximately 1.3 
times the GDP
1 
The intermediation technology is constant returns to scale with intermediation 
costs being proportional to the amount intermediated.  To calibrate the constant of 
proportionality, we use Flow of Funds statistics and data from National Income and 
Product Accounts.  The calibrated value of this parameter equals the net interest income 
of financial intermediaries, divided by the quantity of intermediated debt and is a little 
over 2 percent
2. 
 In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the return on equity and the borrowing 
rate are identical, since the agents who borrow are also marginal in equity markets. In our 
framework, government debt is not intermediated and thus its return is equal to the 
lending rate. The equity premium relative to government debt is the intermediation 
spread. The divergence between borrowing and lending rates gives rise to an equity 
premium even in a world without aggregate uncertainty.  
The paper is organized as follows:  the economy is defined in Section 2.  In 
Section 3, we discuss the decision problem of the agents. Sections 4 and 5 deal with 
aggregation. Section 6 presents the balance sheets, while section 7 characterizes the 
equilibrium. We calibrate the economy in Section 8. In Section 9, we present and discuss 
our results. Section 10 concludes the paper. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See section 8 (calibration) for details 
2 See section 8 (calibration) for details 
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2. The Economy 
To build a parsimonious model that captures the large amount of borrowing and 
lending and financial intermediation, we postulate households with identical preferences 
with respect to consumption over their lifetime but differentiated along one dimension – 
the strength of their bequest motive parameter,α.  
  What motivates bequests?  While a casual consideration of bequests 
naturally assumes that they exist because of parents’ altruistic concern for the economic 
well being of their offspring, results in Hurd (1989) and Kopczuk and Lupton (2004), 
among others (see also Wilhelm (1996), Laitner and Juster (1996), Altonji et al. (1997), 
and Laitner and Ohlsson (2001)), suggest otherwise: households with children do not, in 
general, exhibit behavior in greated accord with a bequest motive than do childless 
households.  As a result, the existing literature is largely agnostic as to bequest 
motivation, attributing bequests to general idiosyncratic, egoistic reasons. These 
empirical results lead us to eschew the perspective of Becker and Barro (1988), who 
postulate that each generation receives utility from the consumption of the generations to 
follow, and bequests as being motivated by a well defined “joy of giving”
3 as in Abel and 
Warshawsky (1998)) and Constantinides et al. (2007)  
Any systematic consideration of bequests mandates that the analysis be 
undertaken in an overlapping generations model context. Consequently, we analyze an 
overlapping generations economy in balanced growth. Each period, a set of individuals, 
of measure one, enter the economy. The measure of types,  () d μα , is defined on the Borel 
sigma algebra of +   .  
                                                 
3 See also De Nardi, Imrohoroglu and Sargent (1999) and Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2007)   4
 All individuals have finite expected lives. They enter the labor force at age 
22, work for T years and then retire
4. Individuals receive a wage income during 
their working years but not during their retirement years. At retirement, 
individuals face idiosyncratic uncertainty about the length of their remaining 
lifetime. Their lifetimes are exponentially distributed. Once retired, the probability 
of surviving to the next period is(1 ) δ − , where δ is the probability of death.   
Expected life is 1/ T δ + . There is no aggregate uncertainty 
  An individual who is born at time t and dies at age j, bequeaths  , tt j b +  
units of the period t consumption good and consumes nothing at that or latter ages.  
For an individual of type α  (born at time t) the expected utility over age 
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Here  1 β < is the discount factor and α is a parameter that governs the strength of the 
bequest motive. Each generation supplies one unit of labor inelastically 
for 0,1, , 1 jT =− … . Thus, aggregate labor supply is LT =  given the measure of each 
generation is 1. 
We only need to analyze the decision problems of an individual of a type α 
individual born at time t = 0. The solution to the problem for groups born at any other t 
can be found using the fact that  
                                                 
4 We implicitly assume that parents finance the consumption of their children under the age of 22 – in other 
words, children’s consumption is a part of their parents consumption. For simplicity (and without loss in 
generality) we assume that individuals are ‘22 year old’ when born and model their consumption and 
investment decisions only after they enter the workforce at age 22.   5
(2.2)   ,0 , (1 )
t
tj j cc γ =+  
Further, to simplify the notation, we use  j c  to denote the consumption of a j year old at 
time j rather than , j j c . An analogous change of notation applies to the other variables. 
Production Technology 
 T he aggregate production function is 
(2.3)  
1 (, ) ( ) tt t t t t t YF K A L K z L
θθ − == 
(2.4)   1 (1 ) tt zz γ + =+ . 
t K is the capital,  t L is labor, and t z  is the labor augmenting technological change 
parameter, which grows at a rateγ . The parameter  0 z  is chosen so that 0 1 Y = . 
Output is produced competitively so that 
(2.5)     (, ) ke K t t t rF K z L δ +=     
(2.6)     (, ) tL t t t eF K z L =  
where  k δ is the depreciation rate,  e r is the borrowing rate and the return on equity, and  t e  
is the wage rate. 
Income is received either as wage income  t E or gross capital income t R . Thus   
(2.7)     tt t YER =+ . 
The wage rate is t e ; (1 ) tt t t EL e Y θ == −; and () tk e t t Rr K Y δθ =+ =. Components of 
output are consumption t C , investment  t X and intermediation t I ; thus 
(2.8)     ttt t YCXI =++  
In balanced growth investment,  () tk t XK δγ =+ and 1 (1 ) tt KK γ + =+ . 
   6
Financial Intermediary Technology 
  There are three assets: private debt, government debt, and capital. A unit of debt 
is a promise to deliver one unit of the consumption good.  The intermediary can hold 
private debt, government debt and capital, and can issues annuities. An annuity contract 
specifies a stream of premiums and payments contingent on being alive at each possible 
age and a payment at death.  The intermediary’s liabilities are the expected present value 
of annuity benefits less the present value of future premiums summed over all its current 
set of annuity contracts.  The lending rate is used in this present value calculation. 
The intermediary’s liabilities are denoted by
I L , its holding of private debt 
by
, PI D , its holding of government debt
, GI D , and its holding of capital by
I K . Financial 
intermediation services are 
(2.9)    
, ()
PI I IDK φ =+  
Note there are no costs of intermediating government debt and the net worth of the 
intermediary is zero. The intermediary balance sheet identity is 
(2.10)    
,, (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
IG I P I I
ee L r Dr Dr K =+ ++ ++  
In the above, (1 ) e r +  is the price of a unit of capital in terms of the consumption good. 
   This being a constant returns to scale technology, an equilibrium condition is 
(2.11)     e rrφ −=, 
where  e r  is the interest rate the intermediary receives on its lending and the return it earns 
on its equity holdings. 
We refer to r  as the household lending rate because households are lending to the 
intermediaries when they pay premiums and once they start receiving benefits, the benefit 
stream is de facto a debt contract. In equilibrium, an intermediary will offer an annuity   7
contract with the property that the expected present value of benefits is equal to the 
present value of premiums using r  in the present values calculations.  
During their working years, individuals can accumulate equity and borrow.  If an 
individual enters into an annuity contract at age j = 0, the pension fund reserves for that 
contract is an asset of that individual
5. Thus, an agent’s asset holdings at point in time are 
pension fund reserves and equities.  The agent’s liabilities are the agent’s private debt.  
Government Policy 
The government finances interest payments by issuing new debt and by a tax τ on 
labor income. The government’s period t budget constraint is 
(2.12)     1 (1 ) tt t rD E D τ + += +  
1 (1 ) tt DD γ + =+ in balanced growth . Therefore,  
(2.13)      () ( 1 ) rD Y γτ θ −= −  
In addition, the government pursues a tax-rate policy that pegs
6
e r . This being a 
balanced growth analysis, government debt grows at rate 0 γ > , which means the 
government deficits are positive and grows at rateγ . 
 
3. Optimal Individual Decisions 
  We consider the optimal individual decision problem, taking as given the size of 
the bequest that he will receive at age 30 and the labor income tax rate,τ  .  At time t, 
                                                 
5 The Flow-of-Funds household sector net worth sector lists pension fund reserves as part of household net 
worth. 
6 In this paper, we fix this to be 5%. This is discussed further in the section on calibration.   8
people age 30 receive inheritance (1 )
t
t bb γ =+ .  At time 0 t = , people aged 30 receive 
bequestsb .   
We use the term ‘annuity’ to denote a contractual arrangement between an 
individual and a financial intermediary where the individual makes premium payments 
during their working years and receives payments when retired.  These payments are used 
to finance consumption when retired. The annuity strategy thus allows the individual to 
hedge the idiosyncratic risk associated with the uncertainty of his time of death. 
In this model, for a reasonable set of parameters, depending on their intensity for 
bequests, some individuals at birth find it optimal to save for retirement in the form of 
annuities and other individuals find it optimal to save in the form of equity.  Some of 
those holding equity will also be debtors.  Given borrowing rates and returns on equity 
are equal, changing equity and debt position has no consequence for an individual 
provided the individual doesn’t become a creditor. In the aggregate the total amount of 
borrowing is determined, but not that of individuals.  
We will show there exists an 
* 0 α >  that partitions individuals into two groups: 
individuals with 
* 0 αα ≤<  choose to annuitize while those with 
* αα >  hold equity 
and possibly borrow.  The function  () U α Δ  for a given economy specifies the 
differences in utilities for the two strategies.  Plotted in Figure 1 is this difference for a 
particular economy.  We see for the economy considered that agents with bequest 
intensity  5 α <  choose to annuitize for the illustrative set of parameters considered. Our 
finding that agents with a low “intensity” for bequest will annuitize is consistent with the 
result in Yaari (1965). 
   9
 
Figure 1 
Utility Difference between the Best No Annuity and Best Annuity Strategy: 
() ()





In light of this, we restrict our further analysis to an economy with two types of 
agents: those who have a zero intensity for bequests and follow the annuity strategy 
(Type A) and those with a high intensity for bequests, who follow the no annuity strategy 
(Type B). The measures of these two types are denoted 
A μ  and
B μ . The motivation for 
the names is that type A will choose the annuity strategy and type B will follow the no 
annuity strategy and leave a bequest. 
A convention followed is that a bar over a variable denotes a constant.  In the case 
where the constant depends upon a person type, that is onα, this functional dependence 
will be indicated. This is necessary, as the best strategy will differ across agent types. 
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3.1  The Best No Annuity Strategy 
We first consider the problem of an individual given that individual’s wealth, 
which for this strategy is the present value of inheritance, 
30 (1 ) b γ + by age 30 plus the 
present value of wages discounted at the rate e r . 
This problem becomes stationary and recursive at retirement age T with net worth  
w being the state variable.  The value function  () fw is the maximal obtainable expected 
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The solution to this optimality equation has the form: 
(3.2)   12 () () () l o g fw f f w αα =+ , 
where  












The optimal consumption and implicit bequest strategies are: 
(3.4)   2 /()






The assets of a person born at time 0 at age j are j w in units of the period j consumption 
good. Bequests are 
(3.5)                      jj bw j T =≥    11
The problem facing an individual at birth that follows the no annuity strategy, 
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Here  0
B v  is the present value of wages and bequest at birth of someone born at 0 t = . The 
solution (see appendix for the expression for ()
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3.2. The Best Annuity Strategy 
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The constant  0
A v  is the present value of future wage income and inheritances using the 
lending rate r of a person born at  0 t = . The superscript A denotes the annuity strategy 
and not an individual type.  It will be the case that in equilibrium type A will choose 
strategy A. 
There are other constraints, specifically, that the worker choosing this strategy 
does not borrow, that is  0 jj ec −≥ . For the economies considered in this study, these 
constraints are not binding and can therefore be ignored.  If, however, the economy were 
specified such that the no-borrowing constraint were binding for some j, then the solution 
below would not be the solution to the problem formulated above.   
The nature of the annuity contract is that the payment to someone alive at age 
jT ≥  is j c . If the individual dies at age j, payment  j b is made to that person’s estate. The 
solution to this program is 
 
(3.11)   0 () ( 1 ) 0
Aj j A
j cc r v j αβ =+ ≥  
(3.12)   0 () ( 1 ) 1
Aj j A
j bc r vj T αα β =+ ≥ +  
 
The net worth of an individual choosing this strategy is his pension fund reserves. 
Pension fund reserves (from the point of view of the company) for a given annuity 
contract for an individual born at  0 t =  at age j is the expected present value at time   13
tj =  of payments that would be made less the present value (at time tj =  as well) of 
premiums that would be received.  
For workers they can be determined as the present value of past premiums. Thus, 
pension fund reserves for individuals born at  0 t = at age j satisfy 
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For retirees, conditional on being alive, pension fund reserves for individuals born at  
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3.3 Best Strategy 
  The best strategy is the no annuity strategy if  () ()
BA UU αα > .  The best strategy 
is the annuity strategy if  () ()
BA UU αα < . 
 
Section 4: Aggregate Behavior of the Household Sector 
Aggregate Consumption   14
This aggregate consumption demand depends upon the labor tax rate τ  and 
inheritance b  as well as the prices{, , } e err , which are determined by policy and by firms.  
Having formulated the optimal consumption strategies for the two types of individuals, 
we can characterize the aggregate consumption, asset holdings and bequest at time  0 t =  
by individual type given  0 b  and 0 e . Given this is a balanced growth analysis period zero is 
as good as any. 
There are two types of agents  {, } kA B ∈ .  The A-type has  0 α =  and will in 
equilibrium choose the annuity strategy given the model economy.  The measure of type 
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The aggregate consumption of both types of agents at time 0 is 
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Where we have used the fact that each subsequent generation has a consumption-age 
profile that is higher by a factor of (1 )
j γ +  in balanced growth. 
  Aggregate consumption is 
(4.3)   (,) (,) (,)
AB Cb C b C b τττ =+ 
Aggregate Asset Holdings          
The aggregate net worth of types  {, } kA B ∈  are   15
(4.4)   00
01
( , ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
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Net worths are as of the beginning of a period and are in units of the consumption good. 
 
Aggregate Inheritance 
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Hence the aggregate bequests at time 0 are: 
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Since we assume that bequests are equally distributed and received at age 











Thus, the inheritance received at time 30 by an individual who is born at time 
zero is  
 
(4.6)     
30
0(1 ) bb γ =+ 
 
This is the quantity used in computing the present value wealth of individuals in 
equations (3.6) and (3.10). 
 
Aggregate Private Debt 
  The aggregate indebtedness of a type B is   16
(4.7)   (,) (,) / ( 1 )
BB
e Db K Wb r ττ =− + 
as the price of existing capital in terms of the consumption good is (1 ) e r + and the 
household is obligated to make payment(1 ) ( , )
B
e rD bτ + . 
 
Section 5: Equilibrium Relations 
From the Production Side 
We determine the value of a set of balanced growth state variables at  0 t = .  All 
variables grow at rate γ  except aggregate labor supply, which is constant and equal to 
40.  Given Y has been normalized to 1 at time zero, the cost share relations determine 
time zero K and wage e: 
(5.1)   () ek rK Y δθ +=   
(5.2)   (1 ) eL Y θ =−  
  From the intermediary’s problem, the lending rate is determined by 
(5.3)   e rrφ =−  
Two Equilibrium Conditions 
Prices  {, , } e err  are determined from policy and therefore only b  and τ  are 
needed to completely specify the household budget constraints. Aggregate 
consumption (,) Cbτ  and aggregate intermediation  (,) Ibτ will be determined by 
aggregating household variables.  An aggregate equilibrium condition is the aggregate   17
resource constraint, 
(5.4)  
1 (,) (,) Cb X Ib KL
αα τφ τ
− ++ = . 














We assume that type B hold all the capital and the intermediary none.  This is done to 
resolve the unimportant indeterminacy.  Increasing the amount of capital held by a type B 
and type B indebtedness by the same value amount does not affect a type B wealth, and 
that is all that matters.  This portfolio shift of the B type individual is offset by a portfolio 
shift of the intermediary.  The aggregate indebtedness of a type B is denoted by (,)
B Db τ . 
An expression for aggregate intermediation is  (,) (,)
B Ib D b τφ τ =  
  The second equilibrium condition is that inheritance of people at a point in time 
equals aggregate bequests at that point in time.  We consider  0 t =  and let  (,) Bb τ  be 
the aggregate bequest at that time.  Given b  is the inheritance that someone born at  
0 t =  receives at age 30 and the economy grows at rateγ , the second equilibrium 
condition is  
(5.6)  
30
30 (1 ) ( , )
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There is a third equilibrium condition, namely the government’s budget constraint. 
Equating payments to receipts,  1 (1 ) tt t rD E D τ + += + . Given   18
1 (1 ) tt DD γ + =+ , 00 (1 ) EY θ =− , and  0 Y  has been normalized to 1.0,  the time zero 
government budget constraint is 
(5.7)   () ( , ) ( 1 ) rD b γτ τ θ −= − Y 
Section 6:  Balance Sheets 
  Assets and liabilities are beginning of period numbers and are in units of the 
consumption good.  We consider only economies for which there is intermediated 
borrowing and lending in equilibrium.  Given there is a large amount of intermediated 
borrowing and lending, these economies are the empirically interesting ones. The balance 
sheet relations,  (assets equal liabilities plus net worth) are: 
Type B:          (1 ) (1 ) ( , ) ( , )
BB
ee rK rD b W b ττ += + +  
Type A:    (,) (,)
AA Wb Wb ττ =  
Intermediary:    (1+r)( ( , ) ( , )) ( , )  + ( , ) 
BG A I Db Db Wb Wb ττ τ τ +=  
Government:  
(1 )












The net worth of the government  (,)  
G Wb τ and of the intermediary (,)  
I Wb τ  are both 
zero.  Further, the value of private debt held by the intermediary is slightly different than 
the value of the associated liability because of intermediation costs. In our model, (see 
section 9 on results) the present value of the tax on wages using a discount rate of 3% is 
precisely equal to the value government debt. Since labor is supplied inelastically and 
taxed at a rate τ , the government effectively owns a fraction τ  of an individual’s time 
endowment (now and in all future periods). Hence, the net worth of the government is 
zero and government debt is an asset for debt holders in our model.   19
Section 7: Equilibrium 
The two equilibrium conditions are linear in(,) b τ , so solving for a candidate solution is 
straightforward.  To be an equilibrium it must be the case that (i) the best strategy for 
type B is the no annuity strategy; (ii) the best strategy for type A is the annuity strategy; 
(iii) 0
B D > ; and (iv) 0, (1 )
A
j o ce τ <− .  The reason for the last constraint is that these 
equilibrium conditions hold provided that the no borrowing constraint of annuity holders 
is not binding and it will not be binding if (iv) holds.  
Section 8: Calibration 
The parameters that needs to be “calibrated” are the parameters related to the 
model people{, , ,,,,, , }
AB AB
WI TT T ααβ μμ δ ; the intermediation technology parameterφ ; 
the goods technology parameters{, , } k θδ γ ; the policy parameter e r . The other policy 
parameters  {, }
G D τ  are endogenous. Many of these parameters are well documented in 
the literature; others are not.  
We proceed by listing them with selected values and a brief motivation 
Parameters associated with individuals 
0.99 β =  
0.05 δ =  (Implies a post retirement life expectancy of 20 years) 
0
A α =  (Assumption. Type A individuals have low bequest intensity) 
10
B α =  (Assumption. Type B individuals have high bequest intensity) 
W T = 22 (Age at which an agent enters the workforce)  
52 I T =  (Age at which inheritance is received) 
62 T =  (Age at retirement)   20
0.88
A μ = (Specified such that the amount intermediated matched U.S. data) 
0.12
B μ = (equal to (1
A μ − ) 
Intermediation parameters 
.02 φ = (Consistent with the average difference in borrowing and lending rates) 
Goods production parameters 
0.3 θ =  (Share of capital in output) 
0.02 γ =  (Consistent with observations on labor productivity) 
0.05 k δ =  (Consistent with capital output ratio = 3, given e r ) 
Policy parameters 
0.05 e r =  (Assumption about government fiscal policy) 
The motivation for this policy is that this has been the approximate after tax return of 
capital in the corporate sector (See McGrattan and Prescott, 2005). 
In calibratingφ we proceed by estimating the value added by the financial 
intermediation sector. The major source of revenue for this sector is the difference in 
interest payments received from borrowers and interest payments paid to lenders. Using 
data from NIPA
7 for 2000 the former amounted to $1,480 billion (0.148 times GNI) and 
the latter to $940 billion (0.094 times GNI. To estimate the services associated with 
intermediating borrowing and lending, we first subtracted services furnished without 
payment by the financial intermediaries, because we see these services as corresponding 
mostly to transaction services. These amounted to $187 billion. Thus, the value added by 
                                                 
7 The data used is from NIPA (2000) tables 7.11 and 2.4.5.   21
the financial intermediation sector is $ 353 billion or about 3.5% of GNI.  A significant 
amount of intermediation services is purchased by non financial business.  We do not yet 
have a good measure of this number. We guess that it is about 0.8 times GNI which leads 
to a number of 0.026 times GNI being household borrowing/lending intermediation 
services.  
Using data from the flow of funds
8, we estimate the total amount of intermediated 
borrowing and lending between households to be 1.3 times GNI (See Table 1 below). The 
implied intermediation spread is thus 2.0 percent.  Some intermediate borrowing is by 
young Type A people in the form of consumer debt. This led us to estimate the difference 
in average household borrowing and lending rates to be 2 percent and in turn the 
calibrated 0.02 φ = . 
We estimated borrowing and lending between households by determining total 
household holdings of debt assets in year 2000.  Not all of this corresponds to the 
household debt in our model. Some is intermediated borrowing and lending between 
young people of the same type. Some is lending for precautionary reasons and for 
transaction purposes (including currency held).  Considerations such as these led us to 
calibrate the measure of Type B so the amount of intermediated borrowing and lending 





                                                 




Interest received by financial intermediaries  0.14480 GNI  Table 7.11 NIPA  Line 28 
Interest paid by financial intermediaries  0.0940 GNI  Table 7.11 NIPA Line 4 




Table 2.4.5 NIPA  Line 89 
 
Intermediation services associated with 
household borrowing and lending
9  
0.0353 GNI   
Total amount intermediated
10 1.3076  GNI   
 
 
Section 9: Results 
We considered three values for
B α , a parameter for which we have little 
information. For each value of 
B α  we search for the
B μ for which the intermediate 
borrowing and lending between households is approximately 1.5 times GNI. The results 
are summarized in Table 2.  The results are not sensitive to the strength of the bequest 
parameter
B α .   
                                                 
9 Net interest less transaction services, which are assumed equal to Services furnished without payment by 
FI. 
10 From FoF year 2000 Table B.100b.e.  This number is Assets (line 1) minus Tangible Assets (line 2) 
minus Equity Shares at Market Value (line 6) minus equity of unincorporated business.  The last number 
was obtained from Table B.100 (line 28).     23
Table 2 
Summary of Results 
 
Economy  6
B α =   10
B α =   15
B α =  
      
A μ   0.863 0.880 0.895 
B μ   0.137 0.120 0.105 
      
Nation Accounts       
A C   0.658 0.672 0.685 
B C   0.106 0.092 0.079 
X 0.210  0.210  0.210 
I 0.026  0.026  0.026 
Y 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Depreciation 0.15  0.15  0.15 
Compensation 0.70  0.70  0.70 
Profits 0.15  0.15  0.15 
      
Net Worth       
    Type A  6.63  6.75  6.85 
    Type B  1.78  1.78  1.78 
      
Government Debt/Y  5.13  5.24  5.25 
Bequest/Y 0.0700  0.0746  0.0799 
Tax rate  0.0732  0.0748  0.0764 
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Table 3 
Inheritance as Fraction of Wealth at Enter into Workforce 
 
  6
B α =   10
B α =   15
B α =  
Type A  0.051  0.054  0.058 
Type B  0.040  0.043  0.045   25
 
 
Total bequests in our model are large, larger than for the U.S. economy.  Total 
bequests reported on U.S. estate tax forms plus total charitable contribution reported on 
individual tax forms were only 0.4 percent of GNI in year 2000.  This number is far 
smaller than the 7.5 percent number for our model economy. We do not view this as 
problematic given the nature of our abstract, and more importantly, because much of 
what we think of as bequests is not reported to the tax authorities. This number would be 
significantly smaller if there were population growth at say 1 percent a year, which has 
been the approximate U.S. population growth rate. The fraction of people leaving 
bequests in a given year would be far smaller and the fraction working higher.   
Introducing population growth would reduce the bequest to GNI ratio by at least a factor 
of 2.  The big adjustment is for bequests not reported on tax records.  
  Some bequests are given prior to death for estate tax reasons and for the joy of 
seeing others benefiting from them.  There are hidden bequests when family businesses 
are transferred to a younger generation.  Further, most estates in year 2000 were less that 
$600,000 and therefore not reported on estate tax forms.  Converting the inheritance to 
the annual wage, in our model economy an individual receives 3.4 times their annual 
wage when 52 years old.  With 1 percent population growth this would be reduced by 
over a factor of 2.  These consideration suggest that bequest are not excessive in our 
model world. 
  One variable of interest is the fraction of wealth that is inherited.  A significant 
component of wealth is human capital, which is the present value of wages.  It is about 
94.5 percent and would be higher if there is population growth. These results are for a   26
type A, who discount using a 3 percent rate. The share is a little lower for type B who use 
a 5 percent discount rate. 
  Government debt may appear large relative to explicit U.S. government debt, 
which is only 0.3 times GNI.  In fact, the estimates of implicit Social Security Retirement 
and Medicare promises are over 3 times GNI by most estimates. Further, with population 
growth this number would be significantly smaller.  Perhaps the consumption value of 
Medicare payments is less than the cost to the government.  Thus government debt is not 
large.  If the government prohibited bequests, the steady state capital stock would be the 
same, namely 3 times GNI with the given government policy. 
 
Lifetime and cross sectional consumption patterns 
Figure 2 plots the lifetime consumption patterns of the two types.  Type A’s consumption 
grows at a constant rate  (1 ) 1 0.02 r β +− ≈  conditional on being alive. Type B’s have a 
higher saving rate during their working life.  Once retired their consumption grows at a 
lower rate, which can be negative if the bequest motive is sufficiently strong.   27
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 



























Retirement age Working age
 
  Figure 3 plots consumption by age at a point in time.  Young and old of Type A 
consume the same.  For type B, however, consumption starts low and increases through 
out the working life and declines throughout the retirement period. However, it is worth 
noting that there little dispersion of consumption between the two types of agents. 
 
Equity holdings by age and concentration of equity holdings 
  Only type B hold the capital. Figure 4 plots their holding by age at a point in time.  
There is a high concentration of capital ownership with 33 percent of type B holding half 
the capital stock.  But Type B is only 12 percent of the population so less than 4. percent 
of the households own half the capital stock in this economy even though all have the 
same inheritance and the same lifetime pattern of wages if they are born at the same time.  
While there is considerable dispersion in net worth over the life cycle, it is considerably 



























Conditional on being alive
Total by age
Retirement age Working age
           3.9% of  the population and 
           50% of total capital
 
 
The red line is the Type B net worth conditional on being alive, that is  (1 )
Bj
j w γ
− + , while 
the black dotted line is the total net worth of an agent type B at age j at period zero. That 
is,  (1 )
Bj
j w γ
− +  if j<T and  (1 ) (1 )
Bj j T
j w γδ
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Cost of financial market constraints 
  What are the gains to a household of having access to the equity market at no 
intermediation cost?  Table 4 reports the cost of not having this access, (which was the 
case for most Americans prior to the development of low cost indexed mutual funds) as 
being about 25 percent of wealth at entry into workforce.  This wealth is the present value 
of labor income and inheritance. 
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Table 4 
Cost to an A of not Having Access to the  
Annuity Market 
B α   Change in  0







Cost to a B of not Being Permitted to hold Equity Directly 
 in Units of Wealth at Entry into Workforce 
B α   Change in  0





These tables shows the percentage increase in either  0 e or  0
k v  necessary to compensate 
agent k in utility if he is forced to switch to a system other than his most preferred choice. 
Since both, consumption and bequest are linear functions of initial wealth; the percentage 
changes in both consumption and bequest are the same as the percentage change in initial 
wealth.  
What are the costs to a type A if for some reason such as adverse selection 
problems or legal constraints, they do not have access to annuity markets, and must use 
the equity option for saving?    32
Table 6 
Cost to an A of not Having Access to Annuity  Markets 
in Units of Wealth at time of Entry into Workforce 
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Section 10: Concluding Comments 
  
  In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous agent economy where agents differ as to 
the strength of their bequest motive. In equilibrium, households with a low motivation to 
bequeath lend and hold annuities, while those with a well-articulated preference for 
bequests borrow and hold equity. This is important, for the amount borrowed by 
households must equal the amount lent by households.  In our framework, we are able to 
account for both the amount of intermediated borrowing and lending between households 
and the average spread in borrowing and lending rates resulting from intermediation 
costs. 
  We find that incorporating the divergence between borrowing and lending 
rates can account for a third of the historically observed equity premium of 6%, even in a 
world without aggregate uncertainty. This supports the conclusion of our 1985 paper that 
the premium for bearing systematic risk is small. 
Our analysis in this paper is admittedly stylized. However, we believe the 
abstraction is well suited to address the impact of the costs associated with financial 
intermediation on the equity premium. We view this as a first step in what we conceive of 
as an important research agenda. Possible extensions include building in differential 
survival rates and addressing the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard when 
pricing annuities. We expect these extensions to yield theories that, in addition to 
matching the quantity intermediated and the intermediation spreads, also match the stocks 
of assets held. We will, of course need detailed statistics on individual asset holdings to 
investigate these issues.    34
This research program, if successful, will interface with the literature on 
household lifetime consumption behavior. Such an interface will require an extension as  
the bequest motive is not the only factor that differentiates people.  There surely are 
differences in preferences with respect to consumption today versus consumption in the 
future and differences in preferences that give rise to differences in lifetime labor supply. 
Our analysis suggests that asset holdings and consumption over the lifetime should be 
jointly considered. 
   35
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